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DCI/IC-73-0255/2

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210015-4

9 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT : Proposed Memorandum for DCI on NIO/USIB Interface

1. Following are my comments on the draft subject memorandum. I will first have some general comments about the subject as a whole, followed by some more specific comments, particularly in those areas which I am most directly concerned with. In general, I favor a coupling between the NIOs and the USIB committees. You will recall that I supported this concept when last we discussed the subject in a Management Committee meeting. I believe, however, it would be a mistake to insist that there be a one to one correlation across the board. In other words, I think certain NIOs are logical choices for chairmen of USIB committees, but I feel it would be inappropriate in a number of other cases. I am somewhat unclear as to exactly where we stand on what subjects or areas will be covered by NIOs and I was of the opinion that the Acting DCI had in mind that certain NIOs would be people wearing two hats and not full time in the NIO capacity. These types of questions will obviously have a bearing on our final decisions in this area.

2. As to the question of what USIB committees should exist in the new structure, my views vary considerably from those expressed in the draft memorandum. Although not stated, it seems to me the paper strongly infers that we must have fewer committees than now exist. I recognize at first glance the list of committees is long indeed, and one tends to start with a view that somehow we must reduce that number. I have seen no case made to support that when the committees are carefully examined individually. It obviously could be presumed that that large number of committees poses a span of control problem for the DCI. If the policy established by Mr. Helms is followed, that in fact is not the case. Some years ago Mr. Helms addressed this subject in several meetings and finally decided to change what then theoretically existed, namely direct access by all USIB committee chairmen to the DCI. He designated the various Deputy Directors a responsibility to attempt to resolve as many issues as possible relating to committees under their purview before the matter comes to his attention. I won't go

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through the whole breakdown, but in my case that responsibility concerned GMAIC, JAEIC, and SIC. I can recall very few times since that procedure was established that one of these committee chairmen has found it necessary to approach the DCI directly. I considered myself functioning as a Staff Officer for the DCI for this purpose, not as a line manager in the CIA. Having chaired GMAIC for a number of years and having had this responsibility a number of years as well, I would like to comment on this committee further.

3. Whereas the draft suggests a single committee handling all topics assigned to these three committees, I believe that if there is any change it should be the other direction. GMAIC and JAEIC are in my view two of the more effective USIB structures (I admit there may be some bias as regards GMAIC). Both of these committees have been extremely effective in dealing with very important questions and although there have certainly been disagreements in the Community, particularly in the missile field, I think on the whole the number of differences that have emerged from the committee have been less than expected and that GMAIC has done a fully acceptable job of minimizing the number of differences that have had to be resolved at the USIB level.

4. As for JAEIC, there are a number of problems associated with dissolving it. The draft recognizes that a NSCID change would be required but fails to take note of several additional problems that would be created. A bit of history seems appropriate. On 7 Aug. 1947 Sen. B. B. Hickenlooper, Chairman of Atomic Energy, Congress of the U.S. requested in a letter to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the AEC (1) that the Joint Committee "be informed of the combined judgment of these departments as to the earliest date by which any other nation without our aid may be expected to produce the first atomic bomb" and in addition "the time thereafter when such nation may be expected to produce additional bombs in numbers."

5. The heads of State, War, Navy and the Chairman of the AEC "agree that it would be desirable for the Central Intelligence Group to coordinate an interdepartmental study" as requested by Sen. Hickenlooper. Although there were a few intervening steps, it was this direct request from the Congress which led to the establishment of JAEIC. Finalization of the committee structure occurred on 21 Nov. 1949 just after signing of the National Security Act of 1947. One of the many functions performed by JAEIC is to prepare periodic monitoring reports on the Limited Test Ban treaty which are submitted to the

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Joint Congressional Committee as well as to appropriate officials in the Executive Branch. It is clear we do not want to significantly change that committee or its charter without congressional consultation and it is my strong opinion that the Joint Committee would object to these functions being in any way diluted by subordinating JAEIC functions to some larger body other than USIB.

6. Another area that would require significant amendment is the contents of NSDM-50 of 6 April 1970 "release of public information concerning foreign nuclear tests." That Presidential directive assigns JAEIC as a specific participant in the procedure defined. The draft of that NSDM was prepared by JAEIC after many months of study and debate. I see no reason that we should want to go through that again.


7. Of the three committees mentioned above, the poorest job has probably been done by SIC. That is not because people have not tried, it is rather the fact that SIC is simply trying to cope with too many problems. It is very difficult if not impossible to find men who are broad-gaged enough to be expected to be expert in all of the areas SIC tries to follow. If there is a change to be made with regard to that committee it might be far better to subdivide it rather than to lump it with two other highly specialized groups.

8. Although I have no direct responsibility for the SIGINT committee, my directorate does have a heavy involvement with it. My view is that it suffers from some of the same problems as SIC, namely trying to deal with too many highly specialized subjects. Given the importance of telemetry as well as other ELINT and that personnel have tended to become specialists in either COMINT or ELINT, I think there would be merit in subdividing the SIGINT committee so that indeed we had a committee on COMINT and one on ELINT. Reorganizations at NSA recently show clearly that they acknowledge this distinction as being real and I believe the USIB work could be better handled along the same lines NSA is dealing with the problem.

9. I pretend no expertise in economic intelligence but it is this lack of knowledge that prompts me to question whether this is the right time to rid ourselves of a USIB committee dealing with economic problems. I have sensed that it is very difficult for many senior intelligence officers, including myself, to understand the finer points of economics in this country, much less in the rest of the world. If we are indeed to continue and in fact improve and expand our economic intelligence effort, it seems clear that we need some forum where the experts in this field can coordinate their efforts.

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10. In sum, I like the idea of some degree of coupling between the NIO structure and the USIB committee structure. I think, however, the degree of coupling should be decided on a case by case basis rather than trying to establish an over all policy to that effect. The idea of reducing the number of committees sounds right to me in theory, but as I have carefully examined the committees with which I am most familiar I find that I cannot support that theory. There are clearly some things that could be improved about the USIB mechanism, but I am afraid the changes proposed in this draft would not represent improvement, I believe that we would find that some of our most effective committees would be making giant steps backward. As I pointed out at the time, the briefing I received on this subject from the IC Staff was too superficial to be used as a basis for a management decision on this subject. I will be happy to discuss the entire subject further at your convenience.



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